Ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these evolutionary game models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.
Other species, such as the hamadryas baboon, have been documented to exhibit similar behavior.
3 Because a caterpillar virus wiped out his butterfly population before Gilbert completed his studies, Gilbert's original study, the one described in Maynard Smith (1988) , was never published (L. E. Gilbert, private communication to Yee) . In any case, R. Lederhouse describes similar observations of a closely related butterfly species (see Scriber, Tsubaki, and Lederhouse 1995).
sors, that is, whoever first stakes out a hilltop is granted a socially-established privilege to keep it (not unlike in the Anglo-American doctrine of adverse possession).
In a series of experiments with pairs of randomly selected male butterflies, Gilbert ruled out A, and found support for the prior possessor theory, B, as follows. He convinced each butterfly of a pair that it was the sole occupier of the same hilltop by letting it be the hilltopper on alternate days.
On its days off, Gilbert kept the sidelined butterfly unaware of its counterpart's existence by confining it in dark room. After a couple of weeks, each male clearly acted as the hilltop's rightful proprietor, chasing away all comers, who invariably retreated without much protest. When Gilbert finally released both males to the same hilltop on the same day, an abnormally prolonged contest between the two "proprietors" ensued, lasting many minutes and causing serious injury to each contestant. As a result, Gilbert concluded that deference to prior hilltop possessors is an instinctive trait of swallowtails.
Maynard Smith (1982) and others hypothesized that such instincts evolved by natural selection of the fittest and constructed evolutionary game theories modeling the evolutionary processes. In these models, deference to possession-a dispute resolution strategy based on pre-existing status-is evolutionarily preferred over an always-fight strategy, which costs too much, and a never-fight strategy, which yields too little.
Ownership conventions in human societies range from the simplest unspoken norms, such as not cutting ahead of somebody else in a grocery store queue to much more involved rights bundles expressed in the Common Law.
A broad range of viewpoints (Rose 1985 in Section 4, possession with the right to trade is an ESS.
Evolutionary Stable Strategies
Social benefits come only at a price: for every benefit accrued, there must be set of behavioral constraints or obligations to be fulfilled. Social normsprevalent responses to recurring social situations-are the reciprocal con- 4 In a nutshell, Locke's view is that one owns one's body and, by extension, the fruits of his body's labor. Hence, first useful possession establishes a property right (Epstein 1979) . 5 The normative law and economics view may be summarized as follows. Property rights may be thought of as a bundle of strands of primitive rights. Particular strands-tailored to the situation-are granted to encourage social-welfare-optimizing use and investment. A benefit-cost balance determines whether a particular strand should be granted enforcement. Costs include enforecement costs (Posner 1992 Evolutionary game theory provides a quantitative dynamical theory of how such social constraints on behavior can emerge from anarchy. 6 The basic ingredients of evolutionary game models for our purposes are:
• a self-contained community of disputants interacting in repeated, random pairwise encounters;
• who, at each encounter, select from a predetermined 7 menu of strategies, say, {α, β, γ, · · ·} which may be either pure or mixed.
• If player #1 chooses strategy α and #2 chooses β, the payoff to player #1 is denoted w αβ , which is determined entirely by α and β.
• A round consists of many random encounters for each player. After each round, the community undergoes "natural selection," in which strategies replicate in proportion to how far above average their scores in the just-completed round were; those with below average scores die off in proportion to how far below average they were.
Consequently, an adaptive population evolves according to a set of coupled first-order differential equations-one corresponding to each strategyin the same spirit as the Malthusian predator-prey relations. Solving the equations yields a phase diagram in strategy space, which typically has several fixed points (Friedman 1991) . Some of these fixed points are attractive:
6 Axelrod (1986) argues that social norms cannot survive unless there is a secondary norm enforcing the first norm. This implies the need for a tertiary norm to enforce the secondary norm, and so forth ad infinitem. (See also Martinez Coll and Hirshleifer 1991; Lomborg 1996.) In contrast, the elegance of evolutionary stable strategies (as exemplified by the models herein) is that, within the context of the game, they do not require such an infinite hierarchy of supporting norms. 7 In more ambitious formulations the strategy space is permitted to evolve via mutations in analogy to genes in biology.
5
populations always evolve into them so that they are evolutionarily stable against subversive mutations. Each attractive fixed point in a phase diagram represents an "evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)."
In other words, an ESS is a possible mode of behavior that might lockin. Thus, an ESS can be interpreted as a social norm.
For purposes of this article, it will be sufficient to state a criteria defining ESS(es) given the game's defining payoff matrix. 8 To this end, for a given game strategy α ⋆ is an ESS if, starting from a status quo where α ⋆ is the norm, it is not possible for insurgents to achieve higher payoffs with a renegade strategy, say, γ. Algebraically, this means α ⋆ is an ESS if either
or w α⋆α⋆ = w γα⋆ and w α⋆γ > w γγ ∀γ.
Condition (2) is sufficient to establish an ESS because, even if w γα⋆ = w α⋆α⋆ , invaders behaving according to γ cannot successfully gain a foothold if they perform so poorly against each other that they prevent themselves from becoming a sizable fraction of the population. Note that whether a strategy is an ESS or not depends on the strategy space, the set of competing strategies.
What is an ESS in one strategy space may cease to be an ESS if the strategy space is expanded to include other strategies. Also, games can (and usually do) have more than one ESS.
Of direct relevance to us is the Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith 1973), whose payoffs are depicted in Figure 1 . In this game, two equally matched In neoclassical game theory (e.g. Baird, Gertner, and Picker 1994), 1 2 V > h corresponds to the Prisoner's Dilemma while 1 2 V < h corresponds to the Chicken game. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, H is called "defection"
and defection is the unique Nash equilibrium strategy for both players. In the Chicken game, the unique Nash equilibrium is for one player to be the The material in this section was established by Maynard Smith (1982) and others. While the Hawk-Dove game has provided insights into animal behavior, it is too simple to allow for more sophisticated human strategies.
Humans act like neither Hawks, Doves, nor mixtures thereof. Rather, we have more sophisticated options. The next section turns to one of them.
Possession as an ESS
"Finder's keepers" and "first come, first serve" are not only basic thumb rules in playground citizenship, they are powerful norms that have been recognized by the courts and applied widely in such varied settings as adverse possession, abandoned property, fisheries, wildlife, seabed minerals, groundwater rights,
Payoffs to disputants (#1, #2) in the "Hawk-Dove-Possessor" game. If Possessor P owns a piece of land, it will fight for it as a Hawk; if P's opponent is the owner, P defers to him and acts as a Dove. f is the fraction of time on average a disputant expects to be in the role of owner.
intellectual property, debt collection, oil and gas, pollution permits, the radio frequency spectrum, satellite orbits, and ownership of wartime spoils.
To model this norm as an ESS, introduce the "Possessor (P)" strategy:
The Possessor strategy models the practice of "possession". Unlike Hawks and Doves, Possessors observe convention based on their status; their behavior depends on whether they are the owner or intruder. is the expected fraction of confrontations in which a disputant anticipates she will be in the role of Owner. We will show that P is the unique ESS for all f in the interval (0, 1). This implies that the Possessorship strategy is robust to the wealth (or dearth) of ownership opportunities available -all one requires is a nonzero chance (f = 0) to be an owner.
The payoffs of the Hawk-Dove-Possessor game are motivated as follows. Also of interest is when land is scarce and not everyone can own a plot.
Then the probability f of being an owner in a random encounter is no longer 1 2 , but will be some positive number less than that. To obtain an expression for f , let n denote the number of available plots, and N the total number of disputants. Assume N ≥ n and that N is very large. Assume everyone has an equal chance to be an owner and nobody owns more than one plot of land at any time. Then the chance to be an owner is g = 
The overall fraction f of time a random disputant plays the role of owner in an encounter is f = chance to be an owner × fraction of encounters in owner ′ s role if owner
In the limit where the number N of disputants is large and the ratio g = n/N 11 is finite (n may or may not be large depending on the value of g, but n is strictly less than N),
In this limit, 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 2 because 0 < g < 1.
In particular, f = 0 when the chance of land ownership is zero (g = 0). When land is scarce (n << N), the chance of land ownership is small (g << 1) and so is f ∼ g. On the other hand, when the chance of land ownership is almost certain
In the Hawk-Dove-Possessor game, at each encounter a disputant can either behave like a Hawk, a Dove, or a Possessor. 
For example,
and Possessor is an ESS for the Chicken game because it provides a predictable and costless mechanism for resolving disputes. As in the game, possession in the real world serves to establish an asymmetric dispute resolution mechanism in an otherwise symmetric situation. This role is consistent with the prolific public notice requirements usually associated with possession, in- 
Why not Anti-Possessor?
I asserted at the beginning of Section 3 that the virtue of Possessorship is dispute resolution via an objective symmetry-breaking criterion. Yet, Possessorship is not the only symmetry-breaking mechanism one can imagine.
In particular, consider its mirror image, the "Anti-Possessor (AP) strategy:"
AP ≡ D if current owner; H if current intruder.
One might reasonably guess that Anti-Possessorship would serve just as well as Possessorship as a symmetry-breaking device. AP indeed is an ESS in a game consisting of Hawks, Doves, and Anti-possessors.
In animal societies, AP is rare, but not totally unheard of. The social spider Oecibus civitas lives together in groups, but each constructs its indi- It is apparent why P is more common than AP in both nature and culture. AP is disfavored due to nomadicy costs. In an AP culture, citizens are forced to alternate as owners and intruders in an unending tag-team match. Due to relocation costs, AP is not as viable as P.
Trade as an ESS
While possession retention is the first strand of property rights, the trading is the second strand. Trade is efficient because if an intruder values a property at $V while the current owner values it at $v < $V , then both benefit if the owner sells it to the intruder for $x where v < x < V.
Beyond restricting x to the interval (v, V ), the model here does not have anything to say about whether the transaction price $x is paid in money or another asset of value $x. The model also does not specify how the value of
x is determined -whether by case-by-case negotiation or by an exogenously given recipe. In this section, I will simply show that trading is an ESS for any x ∈ (v, V ). The point is that trade is evolutionarily preferred over stoic possessorship (P).
Suppose in every encounter, the two disputants do not value the disputed property equally because, for example, they always have slightly different reasons for wanting the property. Let $V and $v, with v < V , denote the two mismatched valuations. Define a "Trader (T)" as a Possessor who is willing to sell or buy for $x when dealing with a fellow Trader. In particular, when both owner and intruder of a particular encounter are Traders, and the intruder values the property more (e.g., at $V ) than the owner, he will want to purchase the property from the owner for $x, where v < x < V .
Symbiotically, a Trader-owner who values the property less (e.g., at $v) than a Trader-intruder will readily agree to sell the property to the latter for $x.
In other words, is the weighted average of four conditional payoffs:
For instance,
The ESSes of the Trader game depends the relative values of the cost of fighting h, the average spoils of sharing without fighting V ≡ V +v 4
, and the incremental expected per party gain from trading
. As depicted in Figure 4 , when the cost of fighting is small (Region I), H is an ESS and T In Region II, hawkishness is viable because the cost of fighting is less than the expected spoils V . At the same time, the cost of fighting exceeds the expected harm from not Trading, so Trading is also viable. As it is, if everyone is trading in Region II, a disputant is better off to trade. On the other hand, if everyone is a Hawk in Region II, a disputant is advised to also be a Hawk.
These results follow from verifying the necessary and sufficient ESS Criteria (1) and (2). The intuition for why Region III (h > V ) is a tradeonly region is as follows. In this case, within the H-D-P strategy subspace P is the ESS (for the same reasons why P is the ESS in the Hawk-DovePossessor game). T fares no worst than P against Hawks and Doves since States, but whether it does or not is difficult to assess because determining the parties' costs and benefits in these situations is difficult. Suppose costs are such that Region II applies in some legal disputes, such as bankruptcy or tort cases. Then bankruptcy cases may be more likely settled out of court (a T strategy) while tort litigation may go to trial more frequently (an H strategy) simply because historically a T strategy has emerged as normal practice in bankruptcy while an H strategy is the norm in tort litigation. Once an ESS is established, the strategy (T or H) becomes the modus operandi when that kind of dispute arises even though the other strategy could fare equally well if everyone were to adopt it instead.
Finally, Figure 4 highlights the cost h, which is exogenously given, as the critical determinant of whether T or H or both are evolutionarily favored.
As law has the power to change h by exacting extra penalties and fees on disputants, an implication of the Trading game is that law can inspire or hinder the evolution of trade by its assessment of penalties on hawkishness or trading.
Concluding Remarks
The Hawk-Dove-Possessor game and the Hawk-Dove-Possessor-Trade game provide two messages. The first message is that deference by intruders to owners is evolutionarily preferred over non-status-based behavior. This is For an evolutionary theory of social norms, it is unlikely that human social norms are biologically evolved like butterfly territoriality is. Rather, the allusion to biological evolution must be metaphorical. In biological evo- A cross between Dawkins' memes and Epstein's theory of sociobiological enhancement is compelling. In this picture, less successful individuals and groups within a population must imitate the behavior of their more successful peers in order to successfully compete for resources. Accordingly, the more above average an individual is, the more others copy his behavior. As a result of peer mimicry, the population establishes and self-enforces over time standards of normal behavior. Normal behavior may either be timeindependent or it may cycle through a range of behaviors. This picture is naturally reconciled with evolutionary games because the evolutionary process is essentially a scenario of replication dynamics based on survival of the fittest. Any process which favors iterated, merit-based growth of some subgroups at the expense of peers-such as Darwinian evolution or proportional group learning-can be described by evolutionary games.
The appeal of evolutionary games is that participants do not have to be endowed with superhuman characteristics like unfailing Bayesian rationality.
Even butterflies and baboons are qualified to play. All that is asked is that the parties learn by trial and error, incorporate what they learn in future behavior, and die if they don't.
This article also raises another question, What is the connection be- 
